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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ___________________________ 
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 The defendant, Andre Benson Eversley, a citizen of 
Guyana, having been deported from the United States following the 
commission of an aggravated felony, was again found in the United 
States and was indicted in the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands on charges of illegally entering the country.  Pursuant 
to a plea bargain, Eversley was permitted to plead guilty to a 
violation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326(b)(1) (1993) for entering the 
country illegally following the commission of a non-aggravated 
felony.1  The court imposed a sentence of fifty months 
                     
1
.  Reentry into the country by a deported alien is governed by 
§ 1326, which, at the time of Eversley’s conviction, provided: 
 
 § 1326 Reentry of deported alien; criminal penalty for 
 reentry of certain deported aliens 
 
  (a)  Subject to subsection (b) of this 
section, any alien who --  
 
   (1)  has been arrested and 
deported . . . and thereafter 
 
   (2)  enters . . . or is at any 
time found in the United States . . 
. shall be . . . imprisoned not 
more than 2 years . . . . 
 
  (b)  Notwithstanding subsection (a) of 
this section, in the case of any alien 
described in such subsection -- 
 
  
imprisonment.  On appeal, Eversley challenges the propriety of 
this sentence to the extent that the district court used 
sentencing guideline § 2L1.2(b)(2), which pertains to defendants 
with a prior conviction of an aggravated felony and makes that 
status a specific offense characteristic carrying a sixteen level 
increase on the base offense level, as opposed to sentencing 
guideline § 2L1.2(b)(1), which pertains to defendants with a 
prior conviction of a non-aggravated felony and provides for only 
a four level increase.2  Because we conclude that the district 
(..continued) 
   (1)  whose deportation was 
subsequent to a conviction for 
commission of . . . a felony (other 
than an aggravated felony) such 
alien shall be . . . imprisoned not 
more than five years . . . or 
 
   (2)  whose deportation was 
subsequent to a conviction for 
commission of an aggravated felony, 
such alien shall be . . . 
imprisoned not more than 15 years . 
. . .  
 
8 U.S.C.A. § 1326 (1993). 
2
.  At the time of Eversley’s sentencing, section 2L1.2 of the 
sentencing guidelines provided: 
 
 § 2L1.2. Unlawfully Entering or Remaining in the  
  United States 
 
 (a) Base Offense Level: 8 
 
 (b)  Specific Offense Characteristics 
  
  If more than one applies, use the greater: 
 
  (1) If the defendant previously was deported 
after a conviction for a felony, other 
than a felony involving violation of the 
immigration laws, increase by 4 levels. 
  
court’s use of guideline § 2L1.2(b)(2) was proper, we will 
affirm.3   
 I 
 The defendant, a resident alien, was arrested and 
convicted during 1988 in Brooklyn, New York for the sale of crack 
cocaine, an aggravated felony, and was subsequently deported as a 
controlled substance trafficker in January 1989.  In April 1994, 
he was found within the United States, on the island of St. John, 
by a United States Immigration Inspector.   
 Following indictment and plea, the district court 
sentenced Eversley for a violation of § 1326(b)(1).  In so doing, 
the court applied, pursuant to guideline § 2L1.2(b)(2), a sixteen 
level enhancement to Eversley’s base offense level of eight, 
which resulted (following the grant of a three level downward 
adjustment for Eversley’s acceptance of responsibility) in a 
total offense level of 21.  Given Eversley’s criminal history 
category of III, the applicable guideline range was forty-six to 
(..continued) 
 
  (2) If the defendant previously was deported 
after a conviction for an aggravated 
felony, increase by 16 levels. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (1993).   
3
.  In reaching this result, we need not address the question, 
raised by Eversley on appeal, whether § 1326(b)(1) and (2) 
constitute sentence enhancement provisions or criminal offenses 
distinct from § 1326(a), because Eversley’s sentence of 50 months 
was properly imposed even if we conclude that § 1326(b)(1) and 
(2) constitute separate criminal offenses.  See infra note 5. 
  
fifty-seven months.  As we have stated, the court imposed a 
sentence of fifty months. 
 At his sentencing hearing Eversley contended that, 
given his plea bargain agreement, the district court was required 
to use the four level sentence enhancement of sentencing 
guideline § 2L1.2(b)(1) (for defendants with a prior conviction 
of a non-aggravated felony), and a corresponding applicable 
guideline range of ten to sixteen months, instead of the sixteen 
level enhancement of § 2L1.2(b)(2) (for defendants with a prior 
conviction of an aggravated felony), which, as noted, resulted in 
a much higher range.  The district court disagreed, but offered 
him an opportunity to withdraw his plea if he felt that it did 
not accord with his original understanding of the plea 
arrangement.  App. at 49 & 51.  Eversley declined this offer and 
argues on appeal that the district court erred, as a matter of 
law, in applying guideline § 2L1.2(b)(2) to his conviction.  Our 
review is plenary.  United States v. Collado, 975 F.2d 985, 989 
(3d Cir. 1992). 
 II 
 Eversley concedes that he was in fact deported for the 
commission of an aggravated felony.  He nonetheless repeats on 
appeal his contention that, since his indictment was treated as a 
violation of § 1326(b)(1) (re-entry after deportation following 
commission of a felony "other than an aggravated felony") rather 
than of § 1326(b)(2) (re-entry after deportation following 
commission of an "aggravated felony"), the district court should 
have applied the four level enhancement of sentencing guideline 
  
§ 2L1.2(b)(1) (for the prior commission of a non-aggravating 
felony) as opposed to the sixteen level enhancement of guideline 
§ 2L1.2(b)(2) (for the prior commission of an aggravated felony).  
Notwithstanding the parallel structure of the guideline and 
statute, we disagree.  The fact that Eversley pled guilty to a 
violation of § 1326(b)(1) did not eliminate, as we demonstrate, 
the requirement that the sentencing court apply guideline 
§ 2L1.2(b)(2) to his conviction. 
 Section 2L1.2(b) provides for an offense level 
enhancement for violations of § 1326, depending upon the presence 
of specific offense characteristics, and states: "[i]f more than 
one applies, use the greater."  U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b); see id. 
Application Note 5 ("An adjustment under subsection (b)(1) or 
(b)(2) for a prior felony conviction applies in addition to any 
criminal history points added for such conviction in Chapter 
Four, Part A (Criminal History).").  The sixteen point 
enhancement of subsection (b)(2) was added by the sentencing 
commission to strengthen the penalties for violations of § 1326 
by eliminating the government’s need to request a discretionary 
upward departure in cases where the defendant had been convicted 
of a previous aggravated felony.  Commentary to Amend. 375.   
 The structure and language of the guidelines make clear 
that subsection (b)(2) of § 2L1.2 applies to all violations of 
§ 1326.  Section 1B1.2(a) of the guidelines requires a sentencing 
court, in selecting a guideline, to determine the particular 
guidelines "most applicable to the offense of conviction."  
Eversley was indicted for a violation of § 1326(b)(1), and 
  
guideline 2L1.2 applies by its terms to all violations of 8 
U.S.C. § 1326.  See U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 (commentary -- statutory 
provisions).  Similarly, the statutory appendix to the 
guidelines4 refers to § 2L1.2, in its entirety, for all 
violations of § 1326.  Eversley fails to point to anything in the 
language or structure of the guidelines or the history 
surrounding the adoption of § 2L1.2(b)(2) to suggest that the 
sentencing commission intended it to apply only to violations of 
§ 1326(b)(2).  Accordingly, we conclude that the district court 
was required to apply the sixteen level enhancement of guideline 
§ 2L1.2(b)(2) in this case, even though Eversley pled guilty to a 
violation of § 1326(b)(1). 
 Approaching the argument from a slightly different 
angle, Eversley argues that the nature of the § 1326 violation 
controls the court’s factual determination of the defendant’s 
status as a felon or aggravated felon for purposes of applying 
the specific offense characteristics of § 2L1.2(b).  In 
particular, he contends that since he only pled guilty to having 
entered the country illegally following the commission of a non-
aggravated felony, the court could not consider in sentencing him 
the fact that he had actually been deported following the 
commission of an aggravated felony. 
 We reject this argument since the district court was 
required in sentencing the defendant to consider all available 
                     
4
.  The statutory appendix "specifies the guideline section or 
sections ordinarily applicable to the statute of conviction."  
U.S.S.G. Statutory Appendix Introduction. 
  
information in determining whether it was necessary to apply the 
sixteen level enhancement of § 2L1.2(b)(2).  Guideline 
§ 1B1.3(a)(4) clearly requires the sentencing court to determine 
the sentence "on the basis of any other information specified in 
the applicable guideline."  The fact that Eversley pled guilty to 
subsection (b)(1) of § 1326, as opposed to (b)(2), did not 
obviate the need of the sentencing court to abide by the dictates 
of guideline § 1B1.3(a)(4) by assessing the particular character 
of Eversley’s prior convictions and adjusting his sentence for 
his prior commission of an aggravated felony as specified by 
§ 2L1.2(b)(2). 
 The two other courts of appeals to have addressed this 
issue have also reached this conclusion.  In United States v. 
Frias-Trujillo, 9 F.3d 875 (10th Cir. 1993), the court declared, 
in upholding the application of the sixteen level enhancement of 
§ 2L1.2(b)(2) to a defendant who pled guilty to a violation of 
§ 1326(b)(1), that the structure of the guidelines "clearly 
indicates that the sentencing court's consideration is not 
limited by the particular subsection of 1326 at issue."  Id. at 
877.  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit, which is the only circuit to 
have treated § 1326(b) as a separate criminal offense, see infra 
note 5, agrees with this analysis; it has concluded that, 
notwithstanding a defendant’s plea to a violation of 
§ 1326(b)(1), "[t]he clear language of the Sentencing Guidelines 
requires the sentencing court to increase the base offense by 
sixteen levels, if defendant was deported after conviction for an 
aggravated felony."  United States v. Pena-Carrillo, 46 F.3d 879, 
  
883-85 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on United States v. Arias-
Granados, 941 F.2d 996 (9th Cir. 1991)).  Eversley simply offers 
no argument to suggest these cases were incorrectly decided.5 
                     
5
.  The parties devote much attention to the issue of whether 
§ 1326(b) constitutes a separate criminal offense or a sentence 
enhancement provision for a violation of § 1326(a).  This issue 
implicates whether the government would need to establish a 
defendant’s status under § 1326(b) as a "felon" or an "aggravated 
felon" as an element of a § 1326(b)(1) or (2) offense.  While the 
proper characterization of § 1326(b) presents an interesting and 
difficult question that has divided the courts of appeals, we 
need not address this issue since Eversley’s sentence of 50 
months was properly imposed even if we assume that § 1326(b)(1) 
and (2) constitute distinct criminal offenses.   
 This issue was first addressed by a court of appeals in 
United States v. Campos-Martinez, 976 F.2d 589, 591 (9th Cir. 
1992), where a defendant who had previously been convicted of a 
felony was indicted and pled guilty to a violation of § 1326(a) 
for illegal entry following deportation.  While § 1326(a) carried 
with it a maximum sentence of two years, the district court 
imposed a sentence of 30 months, reasoning that § 1326(b)(1) and 
(2) did not constitute separate crimes with different elements 
and maximum sentences, but instead were merely sentence 
enhancements for a violation of § 1326(a).  The Ninth Circuit 
reversed and concluded that the defendant’s 30 month sentence for 
a § 1326(a) violation was improper since it exceeded that 
provision’s two year statutory maximum.  The court reasoned that 
illegal reentry following deportation for the commission of a 
felony is a distinct crime, as codified at § 1326(b)(1), and not 
"merely a sentence enhancement factor for the crime of reentry 
following deportation, which is codified at subsection 1326(a)."  
Id. at 592 ("[S]ubsections 1326(a) and 1326(b)(1) describe two 
different crimes with different elements and maximum 
sentences.").   
 After the decision in Campos, four other courts of 
appeals addressed this issue, and all four disagreed with Campos 
and concluded that the provisions of § 1326(b) are merely 
sentence enhancements for a violation of § 1326(a).  See United 
States v. Cole, 32 F.3d 16, 19 (2d Cir.) (prior conviction 
necessary to trigger subsection (b) need not be proven at trial), 
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 497 (1994); United States v. Crawford, 
18 F.3d 1173, 1177 (4th Cir.) (concluding that any alien who 
violates § 1326(a) is "subject to" the penalty provisions of 
§ 1326(b)), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 171 (1994); United States v. 
Forbes, 16 F.3d 1294, 1300 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[P]olicy and 
precedent persuade us that § 1326(b) should be construed as a 
  
 III 
 In sum, Eversley pled guilty and was sentenced under 
the guidelines to a violation of § 1326(b)(1).  He was fully 
apprised that under his plea arrangement the court would 
calculate his sentence pursuant to the sixteen level enhancement 
of § 2L1.2(b)(2).  In applying this section to his violation, the 
district court correctly interpreted the dictates of the 
guidelines.  Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will 
be affirmed. 
(..continued) 
sentence enhancement provision."); United States v. Vasquez-
Olvera, 999 F.2d 943, 945 (5th Cir. 1993) (same), cert. denied, 
114 S. Ct. 889 (1994). 
 Eversley asks that we follow the result reached by the 
Ninth Circuit in Campos and require the government to establish 
Eversley’s status as an "aggravated felon" as an element of a 
distinct § 1326(b)(2) offense.  But, the sentencing court in this 
case did not rely on § 1326(b)(2), rather it imposed a sentence -
- 50 months -- well within the five year statutory maximum of 
§ 1326(b)(1), a provision to which Eversley pled guilty.  Unlike 
the district court in Campos, the sentencing court in this case 
did not rely on the fifteen year maximum sentence of § 1326(b)(2) 
(for reentry following an aggravated felony conviction) to impose 
a sentence in excess of the five year (b)(1) statutory maximum.  
Therefore, as we have stated, we must leave for another day the 
resolution of the question whether § 1326(b) constitutes a 
separate criminal offense or a sentence enhancement provision. 
